China’s 2026 clean-tech exports are projected to avoid 450 million tonnes of CO₂

The story

China’s exports of clean-energy equipment in 2026 are on track to prevent about 450 million tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions each year outside the country, according to a new analysis published October 29. That is nearly 2% of annual emissions beyond China and roughly equivalent to Brazil’s fossil-fuel emissions. The estimate covers solar equipment, batteries, wind turbines, electric cars and heavy vehicles, electric two-wheelers, heat pumps and electrolysers.

The headline number is a modelled projection, not a reading from a global emissions meter. Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, built the estimate from product-level trade data, deployment in destination countries, local electricity systems and emissions from manufacturing in China. Because full-year customs data do not yet exist, the analysis projects the fourth quarter from growth recorded during the first nine months of 2026.

Those first nine months were unusually strong. The analysis reports that Chinese electric-car and heavy-vehicle shipments grew 61% from the same period in 2025, wind-turbine exports increased 45%, batteries 39%, solar equipment 22% and electric two-wheelers 21%. The resulting annual avoided-emissions estimate rose 26% year on year, after increasing 36% in 2025. Solar contributes the largest share because panels are being installed rapidly on carbon-intensive grids.

The geography is as important as the volume. Although most export value went to the Global North, the study assigns 76% of lifetime avoided emissions to the Global South and 52% to South and Southeast Asia. A unit of clean technology can prevent more emissions when it displaces coal-fired electricity, an internal-combustion vehicle or another carbon-intensive service. AP reported that Chinese clean-energy exports to Southeast Asia rose nearly 160% through September, citing Ember data.

Myllyvirta estimates that equipment exported this year will avoid 8.4 billion tonnes of CO₂ over its working life—up from 6.8 billion tonnes for 2025 exports and 5 billion tonnes for 2024. Wind and solar exports alone are projected to generate electricity comparable to roughly 100 coal-fired power plants each year. Those comparisons translate trade flows into climate scale, but depend on assumptions about equipment life, use, electricity displacement and future grids.

The analysis also includes production emissions rather than treating exported hardware as carbon-free. Its full-year 2025 calculation puts emissions from manufacturing exported clean-energy equipment at about 170 million tonnes of CO₂ in China, against 370 million tonnes avoided annually abroad. In aggregate, that implies a carbon payback of about six months. Product routes vary, however: factory power, transport, utilisation and the technology displaced can all shift an individual project’s result.

Independent reporting supports the scale while preserving the uncertainty. Reuters reported the 450-million-tonne result and the concentration of benefits in the Global South. AP said outside experts considered the estimate broadly consistent with export volumes but could not independently validate the underlying data. Ember publishes monthly country-level Chinese export data and methodology for solar PV, batteries and electric vehicles, offering an additional check on the direction of trade without reproducing the emissions model itself.

The trade conclusion is more nuanced than a simple overcapacity argument. Across most technologies, the analysis finds Chinese exports have entered new or expanding markets rather than reducing other exporters’ volumes in absolute terms. Wind equipment is an exception at the global level. Lower Chinese prices have nevertheless reduced incumbent suppliers’ market share and revenue, creating a policy conflict between rapid decarbonisation, domestic manufacturing and dependence on a concentrated supply base.

INNOVOX analysis: the climate value of an exported device is determined at its destination. Manufacturing scale in China matters, but the large result emerges because affordable equipment is reaching places with fast demand growth and fossil-heavy energy systems. The policy choice is therefore not simply free trade versus protection. Governments need supply diversification and credible labour, environmental and security standards without making the technologies that cut emissions inaccessible to the markets where they have the greatest marginal effect.

What to watch is whether the estimate holds when complete 2026 customs data replace the fourth-quarter projection, and whether another research group can reproduce the avoided-emissions model. COP31 will add a political test: China is opposing tariffs on clean technology, while the summit presidency is promoting global electrification. A useful agreement would pair faster deployment with financing, grid investment, transparent lifecycle accounting and wider manufacturing capacity—turning a trade statistic into durable emissions reductions rather than a one-year headline.

INNOVOX analysis

The most important finding is not the Brazil-sized comparison but where the modeled reductions occur. Cheap equipment has moved into high-carbon, fast-growing markets where each new solar panel, battery or electric vehicle can displace more fossil-energy use. That makes trade access part of climate infrastructure, while also intensifying legitimate concerns about industrial concentration and resilience.

What to watch

Watch whether COP31 negotiations produce an electrification target, whether tariff regimes distinguish supply-chain security from blanket restriction, and whether the study’s projected fourth-quarter growth survives year-end customs data. Independent replication of the destination-level emissions model would materially strengthen the claim.